This paper investigates how integration policies and welfare state regimes have affected the socio-economic integration of immigrants, focusing on eight European countries: Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Austria, and Belgium. It presents comparative data on integration policies and welfare states regimes. The expectations derived from this comparative policy analysis are tested with cross-national data on integration outcomes regarding labour market participation, spatial segregation, and incarceration. The results suggest that multicultural policies, which grant immigrants easy access to equal rights and do not provide strong incentives for host country language acquisition and interethnic contacts, when combined with a generous welfare state, have produced low levels of labour market participation, high levels of segregation, and a strong overrepresentation of immigrants among those convicted for criminal behaviour. Sweden, Belgium, and the Netherlands, which have combined multicultural policies with a strong welfare state, display relatively poor integration outcomes. Countries that either had more restrictive or assimilationist integration policies (Germany, Austria, Switzerland, France) or a relatively lean welfare state (the United Kingdom) have achieved better integration results. These differences are highly consistent across the three domains of integration that are examined, with the exception of segregation rates in the United Kingdom.
Introduction
Immigration has become a highly controversial topic since the beginning of the 21 st century, and 'multicultural' policy approaches to immigrant integration have lost much of their former popularity. The case of the Netherlands plays a crucial role in these debates as the country was long regarded as an exemplary case of successful multiculturalism, but has now come to be regarded as a prime example of the failure of such policies. As I will show below, the Netherlands had, compared to other European countries, granted immigrants a wide range of rights and a high degree of formal equality. The Netherlands also stood out in granting immigrants differential multicultural citizenship rights, for instance special provisions and institutions for religious, linguistic, and ethnic minorities in education and in the media, and affirmative action policies of a wider scope than in other European countries.
Ethnic relations had long remained peaceful in the Netherlands, but after 9/11 this changed. In the days after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, a series of attacks on Islamic objects such as mosques occurred that was unrivalled in Europe (Allen and Nielsen 2002) . On a smaller scale, there were also acts of property damage and arson against Christian churches. Half a year later, the right-wing populist Pim Fortuyn challenged the broad elite consensus on immigration and integration, and criticized fundamentalist tendencies in Dutch Islam. He was murdered by a left-wing activist a few days before the election but his new party gained fifteen per cent of the vote nonetheless.
Another dramatic development was the murder of film-maker Theo van Gogh by an Islamic fundamentalist of Moroccan descent in November 2004, followed by the arrests of several other Islamist radicals who had conspired to murder a range of public figures, including parliamentarian Ayaan Hirsi Ali. As after 9/11, the murder of van Gogh was followed by a wave of violence. In November 2004 alone, a total of 174 violent incidents related to the van Gogh murder occurred, including 47 attacks against mosques, and 13 against churches (Van Stokkum et al. 2006: 141) . The Dutch multicultural dream had become a nightmare.
What went wrong with Dutch multiculturalism and what does it teach us about immigrant integration policies more generally? I will address these questions by comparing the Dutch case to seven other European immigration countries. I will argue that easy access to equal rights, including unrestricted access to welfare state arrangements, in combination with a large degree of facilitation of cultural differences have had unintended negative effects on the socio-economic integration of immigrants, which have contributed to the increased interethnic and inter-religious tensions of the last years, not just in the Netherlands, but in several other European countries.
I will challenge a central assumption in the literature on multicultural rights. In this view, recognition of cultural differences, the granting of special cultural rights, and protection against cultural discrimination are effective counterweights against cultural bias and exclusion in immigration societies, which prevent immigrants from developing their full potential as citizens and keep them in a socioeconomically marginalized position (e.g., among many others, Kymlicka 1995; Young 1990 ). This assumption is challenged by the evidence that I present below, which shows that far from being a country that has successfully reduced socio-economic inequalities between immigrants and natives, the Netherlands is among the European immigration countries in which immigrants are socioeconomically worst-off, in spite of the relatively far-reaching recognition and rights that they enjoyed. Moreover, those other European immigration countries that most resemble the Dutch combination of multicultural integration policies and a generous welfare state -Sweden and Belgium -display similarly unfavourable integration outcomes, when compared to countries that have either had less inclusive integration policies -e.g., Austria or Germany -or a relatively lean welfare state -the United Kingdom.
The analysis supports the idea that there is a 'progressive dilemma' (Goodhart 2004) between sustaining an inclusive welfare state with a high provision level, on the one hand, and policies of multiculturalism that facilitate immigrants` access to welfare state arrangements, on the other. My argument is not the more common one that immigration and ethnic diversity undermine support for the welfare state (although that may be so, e.g., Phillips 1999; Barry 2001 , but see counterarguments in Banting and Kymlicka 2006) . This version of the progressive dilemma thesis argues that multiculturalism is in principle good for immigrants, but that it undercuts support among the majority population for the welfare state. My argument is that in a welfare state context multiculturalism may not be beneficial for immigrants at all, because it risks leading to dependence on welfare state arrangements and thereby to social and economic marginalization.
I emphasize right at the outset that my analysis is not meant to draw conclusions about the normative justifiability of multicultural policies per se. The issue I address is whether such policies have been effective instruments for promoting the socio-economic participation and equality of immigrants. Regardless of the answer to that question, one may see certain policies to recognize and sustain cultural differences as valuable for their own sake. It is equally important to stress that when I speak of multiculturalism in this paper, I mean a particular type of policy approach to the management of immigration-induced cultural heterogeneity, not that heterogeneity itself. As Banting and Kymlicka (2006: 9) have argued, the term multiculturalism is often used to describe both the policy approach and the factual increase in heterogeneity as a consequence of immigration, but it is important to keep the two distinguished, lest deficiencies of particular policies are mistaken for defects of immigration and diversity as such.
I will compare the Netherlands to the set of West European countries that have been the most important destinations of immigration since the 1950s, namely Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Sweden, Austria, and Belgium. I do not consider the very different contexts of European countries such as Spain, Italy, and Ireland that have only recently become important destination countries. Neither does the analysis extend to the classical immigration countries outside Europe such as Canada or the USA because these countries have a much longer and very different history of immigration and have more selective immigration regimes that would bias the comparison with European countries. Issues of comparability across the countries considered in this paper related to different statistical definitions of the immigrant population and to the composition of the immigrant population will be discussed later in the paper.
In what follows, I first show how integration policy approaches vary across the major European immigration countries. I then discuss cross-national variation regarding the inclusiveness and provision levels of the welfare state, and argue how welfare state regimes and integration policies interact. The expectations derived from this comparative policy analysis are then tested with cross-national data on integration outcomes regarding labour market participation, spatial segregation, and incarceration rates. 1 The results suggest that multicultural policies, which do not provide strong incentives for host country language acquisition and for interethnic contacts, when combined with an inclusive and comparatively generous welfare state, produce low levels of labour market participation, high levels of spatial segregation, and a relatively strong overrepresentation of immigrants among those involved in criminal behaviour.
1 Another domain of socio-economic integration that merits comparative investigation is education. However, the available data here seem to be too unreliable. The main source are the PISA studies that were conducted in 2000, 2003, and 2006 under the auspices of the OECD, which measure the knowledge levels of fifteen-year old schoolchildren in reading, mathematics, and science. At least for the Netherlands, the PISA surveys suffer from serious underrepresentation of immigrant children. According to De Knecht-van Eekelen et al. (2006) , 11.1% of the children included in the Dutch 2006 PISA study were born abroad, or had at least one parent born abroad. However, according to population data of the Central Bureau of Statistics (calculated from CBS 2004: 78, 80) , 20.7% of the 10-19 year olds have such an immigration background. There is thus a strong selection bias in the Dutch PISA data regarding immigrant children, and those who did not participate will tend to be lower performers and children who skip classes. Given this selection bias, it is anyone's guess how valid comparisons of the average scores of immigrant and non-immigrant children in the Netherlands are. Crul and Vermeulen (2004) also conclude that the available evidence for comparison of educational outcomes of immigrants is very limited. They consider dropout rates to be (relatively speaking) 'the most comparable across countries ' (2004: 8) . Comparing dropout rates (i.e. leaving school without a diploma) for children of Turkish descent in the Netherlands, France, Germany, Austria, and Belgium, they find that these are below 10 per cent in the last three countries, but over 30 per cent in France and the Netherlands (Crul and Vermeulen 2004: 24-25) .
Integration policies in comparative perspective
Many comparative studies of citizenship and integration policies have focused on the rules for nationality acquisition (e.g., Brubaker 1992; Cinar 1994; Kleger and D'Amato 1995; Safran 1997) . Nationality acquisition is a crucial determinant of migrants' access to citizenship rights, since it entails that they become formally equal before the law. Together with Sweden and Belgium, the Netherlands belong to the European countries with the highest naturalization rates, whereas Germany, Switzerland, and Austria have traditionally had low naturalization rates.
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Access to citizenship rights neither starts nor ends with the acquisition of nationality. If we consider T.H. Marshall's (1950) three categories of rights -civiclegal, political, and social -Western countries have extended most civil rights to all residents. An exception concerns conviction for serious crimes, which may lead to an alien's loss of residence permit and deportation. Some countries, such as Germany and Switzerland have relatively strict rules in this regard, whereas in France and the Netherlands the possibilities to expel foreigners are more limited (Koopmans et al. 2005: 42-43 ).
Many social rights are also available to citizens and residents alike, but long-term dependence on social welfare may block access to a secure residence status or to naturalization in some countries, including Germany and Switzerland (see, e.g., Bauböck 1995; Guiraudon 2000; Koopmans et al. 2005) . The political rights to vote and to stand for election have, by contrast, generally not been granted to non-nationals (Layton-Henry 1990), but in some countries, including the Netherlands and Sweden, foreign residents can vote and be elected in local elections.
Racism and discrimination can be important barriers toward the realization of equal rights. Dutch anti-discrimination legislation, together with the United Kingdom's, compares favourably to most other European immigration countries (Niessen and Chopin 2002; Koopmans et al. 2005: 45-49) . The Dutch situation differs from the British in that discrimination on the grounds of religion is fully covered by the legal framework and jurisprudence, whereas in the United Kingdom it is a long-standing complaint, particularly of Muslim organizations, that 2 Naturalizations in the Netherlands peaked in 1996, when no less than 11 per cent of the stock of foreign residents was naturalized over the course of one year. The naturalization rate has since decreased due to several legislative changes, but also because of a reduction in the pool of potential candidates who are willing to naturalize and fulfil the minimum residence criterion of five years. Among the eight countries compared here, the Netherlands (6.9 per cent) had in 2002 the second-highest naturalization rate after Sweden (7.9 per cent). Belgium (6.7 per cent) followed closely behind the Netherlands (calculated on the basis of 2002 naturalization figures and the 2001 stock of foreign residents from Migration Information Source: http://www.migrationinformation.org/).
anti-discrimination provisions under the Race Relations Act are badly suited to combat discrimination related to religious difference (Modood 1988 ).
An example of the Dutch approach is a 2007 court case, which overturned a decision by local authorities to deny social welfare benefits to a woman wearing full facial covering on the grounds that the impossibility for colleagues or customers to see her face and eyes made her de facto unemployable. 3 Although an extreme (though not a singular) case, this woman's situation illustrates one way how multiculturalism combined with a relatively generous welfare state can lead to socio-economic marginalization. Letting the woman's interpretation of her religious duties prevail over the local government's concern with employability, has the likely consequence that she will remain life-long dependent on social welfare benefits. That this is a choice she is willing to make is in turn related to the level of benefits in the Netherlands, which does not (in combination with other forms of aid for low incomes such as rent subsidies) condemn one to abject poverty.
The Migration and Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) developed by the British Council and the Migration Policy Group allows a comparative assessment of the degree of legal equality of immigrants across 25 EU member states, as well as Norway, Switzerland, and Canada. 4 Countries score high on the index when immigrants can easily and with minimal preconditions obtain equal rights. The index covers 140 indicators in six areas: access to nationality, long-term residence, anti-discrimination, family reunion, labour market access, and political participation. Table 1 presents the overall Index scores for the eight countries of the present study. Sweden turns out to offer the greatest degree of legal equality to immigrants, followed by Belgium and the Netherlands. These countries not only form the top three in Table 1 , but also in the larger MIPEX comparison of 28 countries. The three German-speaking countries, Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, are characterized by a relatively high degree of inequality between immigrants and non-immigrants. Austria occupies a particularly low position in the ranking of what the authors call "best integration practices." Among the 28 countries, it occupies the 26 th place. As we will see further on, what counts as a "best practice" depends a lot on what we focus on, formal equality of rights, or practical equality of outcomes. Waldrauch and Hofinger (1997) for the year 1995. Despite the turbulences and controversies around immigration and integration in recent years, the cross-national differences have been remarkably stable over the period [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . Sweden, Belgium, and the Netherlands formed the top-three in both years, although in 1995 the Netherlands still came in second place, before Belgium. Austria and Switzerland were classified as the countries offering the least equality to immigrants in both years, and France remained situated in the middle of the spectrum. The only major difference between the two distributions concerns the United Kingdom, which scored worse than France and Germany in the 1995 LOI index. Waldrauch and Hofinger themselves however expressed doubts about the validity of this result, which is mainly due to the fact that in the British common law tradition many immigrant rights are not formally laid down in legislation, but determined by jurisprudence. 'Therefore', the authors conclude, 'the UK, being the methodological "problem child" in the sample, might be judged by the LOI-index as being more rigid than it really is' (Waldrauch and Hofinger 1997: 279 ). An additional reason why the United Kingdom emerges as offering more equality in the 2007 index is that the LOI index did not include anti-discrimination policies, an area where the United Kingdom compares favourably to many other countries.
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Next to this individual equality dimension, Koopmans et al. (2005) distinguish a second dimension of immigrant rights, referring to cultural rights that are attributed to them as a group, as well as to cultural obligations that the state expects them to meet in order to obtain full citizenship rights. Whereas the individual equality dimension of citizenship measured by the MIPEX and LOI indices refers to the equal treatment of residents regardless of their race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, or cultural background, the cultural dimension of citizenship, refers to differential rights and institutions based on racial, cultural, or religious group membership. This second dimension of citizenship has been at the centre of philosophical discussions and political controversies on multi-culturalism and assimilation (e.g., Kymlicka 1995; Bauböck 1996; Joppke and Lukes 1999; Parekh 2002) . In their study, Koopmans et al. (2005) considered the following areas for the cultural rights dimension of citizenship:
1 Cultural conditions for naturalization;
2 Allowances for Islamic religious practices outside of public institutions (call to prayer, slaughtering of animals, burial)
3 Cultural rights and provisions in public institutions (Islamic schools and religious classes, toleration of the headscarf, special programming in public broadcasting);
4 Political representation rights (special consultative bodies);
5 Affirmative action in the labour market.
The final column of Table 1 shows the overall score (on a scale from -1 to + 1) of the five countries included in the Koopmans et al. study. The Netherlands turn out to be the country that has granted immigrants the broadest range of cultural rights and special institutions. The United Kingdom comes in second place and Germany occupies an intermediary position. France and Switzerland are the two countries that tend most clearly towards an assimilationist position, granting relatively few cultural rights to immigrants and demanding a relatively high degree of cultural conformity in public institutions. France is the only country where there is a clear contrast between the two dimensions of citizenship as it is relatively inclusive on the individual equality dimension but reluctant to grant cultural rights.
The lack of other systematic studies of the cultural dimension of citizenship makes it difficult to indicate precisely where countries outside this set of five are situated. Sweden emerges from the literature as the European country that most closely approximates the kind of multicultural policies found in the Netherlands (see Alund and Schierup 1991; Runblom 1994; Soininen 1999) . Belgium shares with the Netherlands a history of social and religious pillarization, which has also led to a segmented incorporation approach with regard to immigrants. 5 However, 5 Pillarization (verzuiling in Dutch) was a model of socio-political organization, in which social and religious groups were largely institutionally separated, each with their own schools, media, labour unions, political parties, housing corporations, sports clubs, and a wide range of other associations. Contact existed mainly among the elites of the pillars, who operated according to a 'live and let live' principle, in which each group retained a great deal of autonomy in areas relevant to cultural and religious identity, for instance in education. Because of the greater degree of religious diversity (Catholics and various Protestant denominations, whereas Belgium was in large majority Catholic) Dutch pillarization was more encompassing and wider in scope than its Belgian counterpart (see Lijphart 1968 for the Netherlands; Huyse 1987 for Belgium). Since the secularization of the 1960s and 1970s, pillarization has ceased to be a lived reality for most citizens. However, many of the institutional structures remained, as was the tradition of solving conflicts by granting cultural and religious autonomy to groups, facilitated by state subsidies and consultation rights. In that 8 there are important differences in Belgium between the two language regions, with the Walloon region following a more French-style approach, and Flanders more strongly influenced by the Dutch multicultural approach (e.g., Bousetta et al. 1999; Gsir et al. 2005 ). Where possible I will therefore present data on the two parts of Belgium separately.
Some examples from various spheres of society may illustrate Dutch policies regarding cultural rights for immigrants. In the realm of education (see Koopmans et al. 2005 : 57-61) the Netherlands were until 2004, when the programme was discontinued, one of the few European countries that offered full state funding for education in 'own language and culture.' Classes in minority religions are still offered in public schools, and the Dutch educational system has allowed Muslims and Hindus to establish dozens of fully state-funded denominational schools, which are more widespread in the Netherlands than in any other European country (although even in the Netherlands they only cover a modest percentage of all Muslim and Hindu children).
Dutch public radio and television are legally obliged to reserve twenty per cent of their broadcasting time for programmes catering to ethnic minorities, some of them in immigrants' own languages. 6 As recent as 2002, national public television aired a toddler's programme parallel in four languages: Dutch, Turkish, Arabic, and Berber. 7 In addition, there are subsidized Muslim and Hindu broadcasting organizations, which produce a few weekly hours of religious programmes on public radio and television, as well as dozens of local public television programmes catering to a variety of ethnic groups produced by the state-subsidized broadcasting organization Multicultural Television Netherlands (MTNL).
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The Netherlands have since the 1980s had a series of affirmative action programmes for the public sector, some general (such as the Etnische Minderheden bij de Overheid programme), some for specific professions such as the police or the military. 9 The Dutch state even assists dual Turkish nationals who are employed in the Dutch police or military to meet their obligations to the country of origin by offering (since 2002) an interest-free loan of €6.000 as well sense, pillarization was a kind of multiculturalism avant-la-lettre, and predestined these countries, and especially the Netherlands, to embrace a multicultural policy approach to immigrant integration (Koopmans 2002 (2002), the 'Muslim' character of which is expressed in the orientation of the toilet seat (not facing Mecca) and in a separation of 'private' and 'public' spaces in the apartment, with the kitchen in the middle, de facto allowing the woman of the house to serve the men in the public part without being seen by them. 13 Finally, the Dutch state subsidizes a wide spectrum of immigrant organizations on an ethnic and religious basis and has co-opted their leaders in representative councils for each significant ethnic group, which have significant consultation prerogatives.
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Welfare state regimes in comparative perspective
My argument in this paper is that the effects of immigrant integration policies on the socio-economic position of immigrants are to an important extent mediated by the structure of the welfare state. Esping-Andersen has distinguished three types of welfare states on the basis of their degrees of 'decommodification,' which 'occurs when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market ' (1990: 21-22 ). Decommodification entails both the scope of welfare state entitlements, and the provision levels of these entitlements. In Esping-Andersen`s typology, 'social-democratic' welfare states have the highest, 'liberal' welfare states the lowest, and 'conservative' welfare states intermediary levels of decommodification. Among the eight countries analyzed in this paper, Sweden belongs to the social- democratic type, the United Kingdom (along with for instance the USA, Canada, and Australia) to the liberal type, and France, Germany, and Switzerland to the conservative type. Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands straddle between the conservative and the social-democratic type, depending on which aspect of decommodification one considers, and of course on the somewhat arbitrary decision where to draw the line between the one type and the other (see EspingAndersen 1990: 50, 52, 70-72, 74) . The scores of our eight countries on EspingAndersen's index are shown in Table 2 . Esping-Andersen`s data refer to 1980, which raises the question whether differences across welfare states have changed since then. Scruggs' (2006) analysis of 2002 data, also presented in Table 2 , shows a high degree of stability in the rank ordering of countries, although the differences seem to be smaller than in 1980, suggesting a certain degree of convergence among welfare state regimes in Europe. The only change in the rank ordering of countries concerns Switzerland, which had an average level of decommodification in 1980, but which received the second-lowest score for 'expected benefits' in 2002. Combining the two indicators in a summed score (see the last column of 15 A further indicator of welfare state protection against market forces that one might consider is protection of workers against dismissal. The OECD has compiled a crossnationally comparable index for the 'strictness of employment protection legislation,' which indicates how difficult and expensive it is for employers to fire workers (OECD 2004) . A comparison of our eight countries on this index leads to quite similar crossnational differences as the decommodification and expected benefits indices reported in Table 2 . The United Kingdom offers workers by far the least protection against dismissal, whereas Sweden offers the most protection. France and Germany are however on this indicator more protective than the Netherlands, Belgium, and Austria.
Why would welfare state 'decommodification' or 'benefit generosity' matter for the socio-economic position of immigrants compared to non-immigrants? Morissens and Sainsbury expect 'better outcomes for migrants in countries with high levels of decommodification (the social democratic regime) and worst outcomes in countries with low levels of decommodification (the liberal welfare regime) ' (2005: 641) . Their results based on cross-national data on household incomes corroborate the expectation that high levels of decommodification decrease income differences across non-immigrant households. However, regarding differences in income levels between immigrant and non-immigrant families, no clear pattern emerged, and the expectation that the difference would be smallest where decommodification is high, and lowest in the context of liberal welfare states is not corroborated. Among six countries that they compare in detail, they find that the composition of household income packages (in terms of the balance between earnings and various forms of welfare state transfers) is actually most similar between immigrants and natives in the two 'conservative' welfare states that they compare, France and Germany (Morissens and Sainsbury 2005: 654 ' (1989) well-known and empirically corroborated (e.g., Van Tubergen 2004) hypothesis that immigrants with lower educational skills and concomitant weaker labour market position will tend to migrate to countries with a relatively equal income distribution, which offer disadvantaged groups relatively good protection against economic adversity. Immigration to countries with relatively inclusive and generous welfare states will thus be 'negatively selected,' whereas Switzerland comes closest to the United Kingdom in offering little protection to workers. Strict employment protection legislation may have a negative impact on the labour market opportunities of immigrants because it makes employers more reluctant to hire workers, particularly if there is a high degree of uncertainty about the qualifications and productivity of these workers, as is often the case with immigrants (Kogan 2006) . Indeed, Kogan (2006: 709) finds such a negative impact of strict employment protection legislation on the employment rate of immigrants, although the effect becomes insignificant once she controls for the type of welfare state regime. 16 It should be noted, however, that the Luxemburg Income Study data that Morissens and Sainsbury use does not allow a cross-nationally consistent identification of the immigrant population. Their analysis therefore had to be based on a distinction that could be made consistently, but that is highly debatable, namely between citizens regardless of country of birth, on the one hand, and foreign-born non-citizens, on the other (2005: 642) . This means that part of the immigrant population is included in the citizen category. Since the degree to which immigrants are citizens varies strongly across countries, this is likely to have affected their results. For this reason, the Luxemburg Income Study will not be used in this paper.
countries with higher levels of social inequality will be more attractive as a destination for more highly skilled immigrants.
Second, once in the country of immigration, immigrants' decisions whether or not to invest in improving their human capital in order to find employment (or to prevent becoming unemployed) will be influenced by similar considerations (Chiswick and Miller 1995: 248-249) . In welfare states with low provision levels the economic sanction associated with being dependent on welfare benefits is greater and there are strong push factors for immigrants to invest in improving their labour market chances through language acquisition, education, and gaining knowledge about and developing ties with the host society. By contrast, in generous welfare systems, immigrants with human and social capital deficiencies can maintain a comparatively decent standard of living without making such adaptations.
This tendency can be reinforced by a third mechanism, the subjective perception of welfare benefit levels. Even in comparatively generous welfare states, it is certainly no luxury to be dependent on social assistance. However, how the standard of living associated with being dependent on welfare benefits is subjectively perceived is very likely to be different for natives than for immigrants, particularly for those of the first generation. Deprivation is always relative (Gurr 1970) and depends on comparisons of a present situation to one's own past, or to the situation of relevant reference groups. For natives, the relevant comparison group consists of other, but better-off natives, and thus welfare dependence is likely to be seen as a strong source of relative deprivation. For immigrants and natives alike, welfare dependence will compare negatively (how much negatively will depend on the welfare regime) to their former situation when still employed in the country of immigration. However, for immigrants that source of relative deprivation is not always relevant in the context of European welfare states because sizeable numbers (especially refugees) go straight into welfare dependence without any prior employment history. In 2002 in the Netherlands, for instance, respectively 40, 34, and 33 per cent of recent immigrants from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia were dependent on social security and welfare benefits (CBS 2004: 122) With or without prior employment in the immigration country, for immigrants the present situation will also be judged relative to their economic situation (or that of their parents) when they were still in the country of origin. Even for those on welfare benefits, that comparison is likely to be positive, because their income from welfare benefits is likely to be well above what they earned in the country of origin, even correcting for the greater cost of living in the country of immigration. Moreover, immigrants will compare their economic situation to that of family members, friends, and co-villagers who stayed behind in the country of origin. That comparison, too, will often be favourable, even for those dependent on welfare benefits. Especially the first generation often maintains a lifestyle that allows them to live at a relatively low cost, allowing them to save some money to 13 send to their kith and kin in the country of origin or even to buy property there. All in all, relative deprivation as a push factor to invest in the acquisition of human capital that would allow escaping from welfare dependence is likely to be considerably weaker for immigrants than for natives and this the more so the higher is the level of provisions that a particular welfare regime offers. In other words, my expectation is the exact reverse of Morissens and Sainsbury's, namely that the socio-economic gap between immigrants and natives is likely to be highest in comparatively generous welfare states such as Sweden, and lowest in liberal welfare states such as the United Kingdom.
The interaction between integration policies and welfare state regimes
Integration policies and welfare regimes interact through a number of mechanisms. First, integration policies determine access to equal rights in general, and thus also to entitlements to welfare benefits. In all of the Western European countries considered here, welfare state rights are in principle accessible to all legal residents, but being dependent on welfare may have negative consequences, for instance for the possibility to bring over a spouse from the country of origin or to obtain a more secure residence permit. In theory at least, in some countries, such as Germany and Switzerland, 'reproachable' long-term dependence on social welfare can lead to deportation. Such disadvantages of welfare dependence can be avoided if an immigrant naturalizes, but some countries (e.g., Germany) make naturalization conditional on not being dependent on welfare. More generally, the accessibility of citizenship varies strongly across European countries. As a result, welfare dependence is associated with much greater disadvantages and risks in countries such as Austria, Germany, and Switzerland where the protection of citizenship is difficult to obtain, than in countries with open citizenship regimes such as France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Sweden, where most immigrants do not have to fear negative consequences as a result of welfare dependence.
Second, the cultural dimension of integration policies may have consequences for the human capital deficiencies with which immigrants enter the labour market. Policies that emphasize linguistic and cultural assimilation exert pressure on immigrants to acquire skills, knowledge, and social ties that improve their chances on the labour market. By contrast, multicultural policies that emphasize the own language and culture of immigrants, and stimulate them to orient themselves on their ethnic community, may have the unintended consequence of sustaining linguistic deficiencies and a lack of cultural 'soft skills.' Moreover, the emphasis in multicultural policies on the own group and the maintenance of its language and culture may be detrimental to the development of social contacts across ethnic boundaries with natives, thus depriving immigrants of an important source of social capital, since natives hold the keys to much of the knowledge and positional resources relevant for successful labour market integration.
Positive effects of language acquisition on labour market participation have been corroborated in many studies (e.g. Chiswick and Miller 1995; Dustmann and Fabbri 2003; van Tubergen et al. 2004 ). Chiswick and Miller (1995: 257-258) cite Australian findings that show that English language proficiency among immigrant groups declined after the introduction in the 1960s of minority language classes in schools. They hypothesize that this is caused by the fact that policies of linguistic pluralism decrease the likelihood of English becoming the language spoken at home in immigrant families. Granovetter (1973) has made the general argument for the importance of network ties for access to labour market opportunities. It is not entirely clear whether it is necessarily always 'weak ties' with relatively distant persons that are the most effective, but clearly the persons with whom network ties exist should have 'superior knowledge and influence' (Wegener 1991: 60) . For this reason, social contacts with natives will generally be more valuable to an immigrant for improving access to labour market opportunities than social contacts with other immigrants, because the latter are likely to share a lack of social knowledge and influence. Dutch research shows that there is indeed a positive association between the labour market participation of immigrants and the degree to which they have contacts with ethnic Dutch (e.g., Dagevos 2001; Engbersen 2003) .
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Beyond direct effects on socio-economic mobility, contacts with natives can also have an indirect effect because they promote acquisition of the majority language. Chiswick and Miller (1995) , for instance, find that being married to a native spouse and living in an area with a low concentration of co-ethnics are strong predictors of majority language proficiency. The negative effect on language acquisition of living in an area with many co-ethnics is moreover greatest for those immigrants who are lower-educated, and who therefore already run a higher risk of unemployment (Chiswick and Miller 1995: 263) .
Cross-national evidence on host language proficiency is scant, but the evidence that is available points in the direction that multicultural policies are negatively associated with proficiency in the host-country language. Comparing Dutch and German Turks, a Dutch study (Dagevos et al. 2007: 45-46) shows that whereas 52 per cent of German Turks report a good command of the German language (and 19 per cent report bad or no command), only 39 per cent of Dutch Turks do so (and 28 per cent report bad or no command). These data are however based on different surveys with slightly different question wordings. Ersanilli and Koopmans (2007) compared Turks in the Netherlands, Germany, and France using a standardized survey and a sampling strategy that controlled for the 17 Veenman (2003) finds a similar relation between interethnic contacts and the educational success of second-generation immigrants.
15 region of origin within Turkey, as well as the timing of immigration. They found that Dutch Turks use the host-country language least often, report most often that they have difficulties speaking the host language, and at the same time experience the least difficulty with the Turkish language. After controlling for a range of individual-level background variables, the differences between Dutch and German Turks on these variables are no longer statistically significant, but French Turks are significantly more proficient in the host-country language, use that language more often in contacts with friends, spouses, children, and parents, and experience more difficulties with Turkish than their counterparts in Germany and the Netherlands.
The same study by Ersanilli and Koopmans (2007) also provides rare crossnational evidence on the degree of social contacts between Turkish immigrants and members of the ethnic majority. Controlling for individual background variables, French Turks were significantly more likely to go out with ethnic French friends and to receive them as visitors at home. German Turks were however significantly more likely to have contacts with German ethnics at work than French and Dutch Turks (comparing only those who presently work or have previously worked). Taking work and private contacts together, Dutch Turks have the least access to interethnic social capital. As we will see further below, evidence on spatial segregation corroborates this finding of a relatively low degree of social contact between immigrants and natives in the Netherlands, and a more limited degree of social segregation in France and Germany.
Two problems for cross-national comparison of integration outcomes
Nationally-specific definitions and classifications of the immigrant population
A major obstacle for the cross-national comparison of integration outcomes is that they use different statistical definitions of the relevant populations. In countries with an ethnic citizenship tradition such as Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, most available statistics use the category of Ausländer, foreigners. Due to the restrictive naturalization regimes in the German-speaking countries, the nationality criterion captures a relatively large proportion of the immigrant population in these countries. However, in countries such as France, Britain, and the Netherlands, foreign nationals constitute only half or even less of the total immigrant population (see Lederer 1997) .
Therefore, these countries usually use alternative statistical categories in addition to the nationality criterion. The Netherlands have a wide definition of their statistical category of allochtonen, which refers to persons born abroad as well as persons born in the Netherlands to at least one foreign-born parent. The French statistics do not register ethnicity and are based either on nationality or on the country of birth. The United Kingdom, finally, publishes statistics based on racial identification.
These differences in statistical categories preclude the use of most of the available national data for comparative purposes. However, there are fortunately also some data sets that allow one to define the target population consistently across countries and independent of nationally-specific classifications. Moreover, in other cases, it is possible to gauge the extent to which statistical categorizations affect the results by comparing indicators based on different statistical categories in the same country, as I do when we discuss incarceration rates.
Different compositions of the immigrant population
Given the fact that there are important differences in degrees of integration among immigrants from varying countries of origin (e.g., van Tubergen 2004), aggregate data on labour market participation, segregation, and crime may be influenced by composition effects. Some authors have suggested that the comparatively weak socio-economic integration of immigrants in the Netherlands results from the fact that the country has taken up more, and less educated immigrants than other European countries (e.g., Doomernik 1998; Böcker and Thränhardt 2003) . If this were correct, cross-national differences could simply be due to the different compositions of the immigrant population in various countries, and would have little to do with integration policies and welfare state regimes.
However, this explanation for Dutch integration outcomes does not seem to be valid, nor does it fit the more general pattern of cross-national differences that we will encounter below, in which Sweden and Belgium share comparatively low labour market participation, and high residential segregation and immigrant crime rates with the Netherlands. The statistical compendium on stocks and flows of immigrants compiled by Lederer (1997: 202ff.) shows that over the period 1960-1994 the Netherlands had a higher per capita net immigration rate than Belgium, France and the United Kingdom. But net immigration in Sweden, Austria, Germany, and Switzerland exceeded the Dutch level. The available statistical data do not suggest either that the Netherlands has taken up more lowereducated immigrants. Van Suntum and Schlottböller (2002: 25-27 , 179) present comparative data on the gap in the education levels of non-western immigrants compared to the native population and show that Dutch immigrants lag further behind the native population than their counterparts in Great Britain and Sweden. However, in Germany, France, Belgium and Austria, non-western immigrants are less highly educated in comparison to the native population than in the Netherlands.
Nevertheless, where this is possible, the subsequent analyses will control for variation in the composition of the immigrant population. Labour market data will refer only to immigrants from non-EU countries, thus controlling for the fact that in some countries (such as Switzerland) a relatively large part of immigrants originate in EU countries, whereas in others (such as the Netherlands), a relatively large part comes from outside the EU. In addition, for a few countries comparative data on labour market participation that focus on specific ethnic groups are available. Comparative data on spatial segregation are available separately for a number of ethnic groups, such as Turks and Moroccans. Only the incarceration data allow unfortunately no disaggregation to specific countries or regions of origin.
Labour market integration of immigrants cross-nationally compared
From the arguments and evidence on integration policies and welfare state regimes that were discussed above, we can derive the following hypotheses regarding the labour market participation of immigrants:
(1) Labour market participation of immigrants (relative to the native population) will be lower in relatively generous welfare states of the 'social-democratic' type (Sweden), higher in countries with 'liberal' welfare states (United Kingdom), and intermediate in countries that have 'conservative' welfare states (Germany, France, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands).
(2) Labour market participation of immigrants will be higher in countries where equal citizenship rights are difficult to acquire (Austria, Switzerland, Germany), lower where individual citizenship rights are easy to acquire and pressures towards cultural assimilation are low (United Kingdom, Sweden, Netherlands, Belgium-Flanders), and intermediate where individual rights are easily accessible but cultural assimilation pressures are high (France, Belgium-Wallonia).
Combining hypotheses 1 and 2, leads to:
(3) Welfare regimes and integration policies interact multiplicatively: countries that have either limited welfare states with a low provision level (United Kingdom) or exclusive integration policies that make immigrants' rights dependent on cultural assimilation and avoidance of welfare dependence (Austria, Switzerland, Germany) will have a relatively high labour market participation of immigrants. Conversely, countries that have comparatively generous welfare states and multicultural integration policies (Sweden, Netherlands, Belgium-Flanders) will have a relatively low labour market participation of immigrants. Countries that combine a comparatively generous welfare state with integration policies that are individually inclusive but culturally assimilationist will have intermediate levels of immigrant labour market participation (France, Belgium-Wallonia).
It is worth pointing out that hypotheses 2 and 3 run counter to the policy philosophy of multiculturalism, which assumes that immigrants will integrate better, the easier and the quicker they can obtain formal equality, and the more they can retain and develop their own cultural identities and practices. On the basis of this assumption we would predict the exact opposite of the above hypotheses, namely relatively high immigrant labour market participation in countries such as the Netherlands and Sweden, and low participation rates in countries such as Germany and Austria, where immigrants face stronger barriers to formal equality, or in countries such as France, where there is little space for the recognition of cultural differences. Table 3 shows data from the European Labour Surveys on levels of unemployment, comparing the native born to those born in a non-EU country. The data cover the period 1999-2004 and the category of EU countries therefore only includes those fifteen countries that were members before 2004. Because absolute levels of registered unemployment depend on the state of the economy and the nature of a country's system of social security, the most adequate measure for comparison is the degree of overrepresentation of people born in a non-EU country among the unemployed, which is presented in the last column of the table. Based on this indicator, Germany shows the smallest degree of overrepresentation (about 1.5 times the level of the native born), closely followed by the United Kingdom. 18 In the Walloon part of Belgium 19 , France, and Austria the overrepresentation of immigrants among the unemployed is also comparatively limited, at around twice the level of the native born. In the Flemish part of Belgium, by contrast, the non-EU foreign born are almost 4.5 times more likely to be unemployed than the native born. Switzerland, Sweden and the Netherlands also perform relatively poorly. 18 The German data within the European Labour Force Survey do not include the country of birth variable. Therefore data from the German Socio-Economic Panel are used here instead. These data are not based on a representative sample of all foreign born, but are oversampled for specific ethnic groups, among which those originating in two non-EU 15 countries, namely Turkey and the former Yugoslavia. To investigate whether this use of a different data set influences the comparative results, we can analyze the European Labour Force Survey data comparing national citizens to non-EU foreign nationals, which allows us to also include Germany. Relative unemployment rates for people holding the nationality of a non-EU country are generally higher than those for the foreign born, because the latter include those -generally socioeconomically better integrated -immigrants who have naturalized. However, the ranking of countries is remarkably insensitive to which of the two classification criteria we use. From the country with the lowest to the highest relative immigrant employment rate, the rank order for the year 2000 based on the nationality criterion is Germany and the United Kingdom (both with an overrepresentation rate of 2.20), Austria, France, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium, i.e. almost exactly the same as in These results are in line with the results of a multilevel analysis of the European Labour Force Survey data undertaken by Kogan (2006) , who shows that controlling for broad regions of origin, education level and age, immigrants born in non-EU countries have a significantly higher rate of unemployment rate in countries with a social-democratic welfare regime (Sweden, Denmark, and Finland in her sample) and, at least for men, a significantly lower rate of unemployment in countries with a liberal welfare regime (the United Kingdom and Ireland). Unfortunately, Kogan's analysis does not include an indicator for integration policies and therefore does not allow us to draw conclusions about interactions between welfare and integration regimes.
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Although of obvious importance, unemployment is only a limited indicator of labour market participation. There are a variety of other reasons why people can be outside the labour market. Some of these can be characterized as forms of hidden unemployment, particularly in the context of strong welfare states. In the Netherlands, for instance, almost one million people (on a population of sixteen million) enjoy disability benefits, a much greater percentage than in any other European country. In addition, there are people who receive social welfare but who are not registered as unemployed. In the Netherlands, the most important category to which this applies consist of single women with young children, who receive social welfare benefits without having to seek employment. Finally, some people, in particular part of the married women, are not active on the labour market at all.
We therefore get a more encompassing view of the labour market participation of immigrants by looking at the net labour market participation of the population between 15 and 64 years of age (i.e., the percentage of persons in that category who are gainfully employed). Table 4 shows these labour market participation figures of natives and persons born in non-EU countries. Again, we are especially 21 Excluding the United Kingdom and Switzerland, for which no 1995 data are available, and taking the 1993 figure for Germany in the absence of data for 1995. 22 A further disadvantage of this study, as well as of multi-level studies of integration outcomes more generally, is that in order to arrive at sufficient numbers of country cases, these studies have to include cases that are very different in terms of immigration history from the Western European countries that are central in this paper. Ireland, Italy, Spain, Greece, and Finland have only very recently become immigration countries and many of the recent immigrants in these countries are single males and females who have not (yet) brought over their families. In addition, the Southern European countries have large numbers of illegal immigrants, which are most likely not captured by surveys, but raise the question to what extent those immigrants who do participate in surveys are representative of the larger immigrant population.
interested in the relative difference between the labour market participation rates of the two groups. It turns out that there is only one country, namely Austria, in which there is almost no difference between the labour market participation of non-EU immigrants and that of natives. Germany, Switzerland, and Great Britain perform relatively well, as do to a lesser extent France and the Walloon part of Belgium. Switzerland is the only country where the results in Tables 3 and 4 diverge strongly because regarding the unemployment level of non-EU immigrants Switzerland performed very poorly. The Netherlands, Sweden, and the Flemish part of Belgium have the lowest levels of non-EU immigrant participation on the labour market. Although we limit the comparison to immigrants from non-EU countries, it is still possible that the cross-national differences can be attributed in whole or in part to different compositions of the population of non-EU immigrants. However, some controlled comparisons for specific immigrant groups are available, which do not suggest that composition effects play an important role in explaining the crossnational differences that we find in Table 3 . In a study comparing immigrants from the former Yugoslavia in Sweden and Austria based on data from 1996-1997, Kogan (2003: 607) finds that in Austria, ex-Yugoslavs were more likely to be active in the labour force than native Austrians (84 per cent against 72 per cent), whereas in Sweden ex-Yugoslavs were much less likely to be active in the labour market than native Swedes (54 per cent against 85 per cent). Euwals et al. (2006: 30) have undertaken a similar comparison of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands on the basis of 2002 data, in which they use the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method to compute differences between natives and Turkish immigrants that are standardized for the impact of age and the level of education. In both countries, the employment rate of Turkish immigrants is lower than that of natives, even when controlling for age and the level of education. However, the differences between Turks and natives are much larger in the Netherlands (21 per cent for men and 20 per cent for women) than in Germany (6 per cent for men and 7 per cent for women).
If we return to the hypotheses that we formulated at the beginning of this section, we can conclude that they are largely confirmed by the comparative data. In line with hypothesis 1, the United Kingdom with its liberal welfare regime shows a relatively good labour market integration of non-EU immigrants, whereas the Swedish social-democratic welfare state is associated with relatively poor levels of labour market integration. However, the welfare state perspective does not explain why Austria, Germany, and Switzerland have even higher immigrant labour market participation rates than the United Kingdom, and why the Netherlands and Flanders perform as poorly as Sweden. Moreover, the welfare state perspective does not explain why Wallonia does better than Flanders, because the welfare state regime is -unlike important aspects of integration policies -uniform across Belgium.
These deviations are well-explained by the second hypothesis, which claims that labour market participation of immigrants will be inversely related to the ease with which immigrants can obtain formal equality and the absence of strong pressures towards cultural assimilation. In turn, the integration policy perspective is faced with the deviation of the United Kingdom, which grants immigrants a relatively high degree of equality and recognition of cultural differences, but still achieves a relatively high level of labour market integration. The combined hypothesis 3 therefore captures the results best: countries that either have a limited welfare state or a restrictive and assimilationist integration regime display the highest level of immigrant labour market participation. By contrast, countries that combine a generous welfare state with easy access to equal citizenship rights and limited assimilation pressures (Sweden, the Netherlands, and the Flemish part of Belgium) show the poorest labour market integration of immigrants.
Residential segregation cross-nationally compared
cheap or subsidized housing that tends to be concentrated in certain neighbourhoods.
A more clear-cut expectation can be formulated regarding the effect of integration policies. Segregation is not just determined by financial opportunities, but also by cultural preferences for living among people of the same ethnicity or religion, both among immigrant minorities, and among the native majority. Although voluntary self-segregation of immigrants may play a role, generally the preferences of the majority will have a stronger impact on segregation patterns. Members of the majority have more opportunities to choose where to live, because of higher disposable income, better knowledge of the housing market and in some casessuch as the Netherlands -because housing distribution systems privilege those with longer periods of local residence. My hypothesis is that preferences for living among co-ethnics among both immigrants and the majority population will be enhanced by integration policies that de-emphasize assimilation and that encourage immigrants to maintain their own cultural practices. Policies of cultural difference can contribute to estrangement of the majority population from minorities because of linguistic communication problems and divergent cultural practices, which make natives feel less 'at home' in neighbourhoods where many immigrants come to live (see, e.g., Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007) . The guiding hypothesis for this section therefore is:
(4) Residential segregation of immigrants will be more pronounced in countries with multicultural integration policies such as the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Belgium, and less pronounced in countries that put more emphasis on assimilation of immigrants to the majority culture, such as Austria, Germany, France, and Switzerland.
Residential segregation is not easy to compare cross-nationally. In addition to the usual problem of variation in the composition of immigrant populations, segregation data are sensitive to the size of the spatial units (wards, districts, etc.) that are used to compute indices (see, e.g., Musterd and de Winter 1998; Musterd 2005) . However, this problem is manageable, as data are for some cities are available for different spatial levels of aggregation, which show that the choice of the unit of analysis has only a small effect on the resulting segregation indices. 23 Table 5 presents data for a range of ethnic groups in cities in the eight countries discussed in this paper.
23 The range figures in Table 4 for Bangladeshi in Birmingham and London are based on the ward level (about 10,000 inhabitants, the lower bound of the range) or alternatively the enumeration district level (about 500 inhabitants, the upper bound of the range) as the unit of analysis. The Amsterdam range for Turks refers to three levels of spatial aggregation distinguishing respectively 1,216 grids (the upper bound) and 389 or 93 neighbourhoods (with identical segregation levels at the lower bound). See Musterd 2005: 333-334. 2005: 334) . These group differences confirm the above argument that segregation is related to the degree of cultural difference. As a result of a combination of self-segregation and avoidance by the majority, the more culturally distinct Muslim groups live more strongly physically segregated from the rest of the population than European immigrants or than postcolonial immigrants from the Caribbean, who usually speak fluent Dutch or English and mostly have a Christian background.
Second, we observe major differences across cities and countries, even if we hold the region or country of origin of immigrant groups constant. These differences are largely in line with the expectations formulated in hypothesis 4. Considering the Turks, we find that they have the highest rates of segregation in Stockholm and in the three Dutch cities, whereas in Zurich, Düsseldorf, and Frankfurt they live more equally dispersed across the city. Another Swiss city, Bern, falls in the same pattern, although here the data refer to all Muslims taken together.
Immigrants from the Maghreb (North Africans, Moroccans, Algerians) live most segregated in Antwerp and Brussels, followed by the three Dutch cities. We can conclude from this section that there indeed seems to be a connection between multicultural integration policies and social segregation, as suggested by the high levels of residential segregation found in Belgium, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. By contrast, countries that have put more emphasis on assimilation show more moderate levels of residential segregation. In Sweden, Belgium, and the Netherlands, high levels of spatial segregation combine with low labour market participation, but in the United Kingdom high levels of ethnic segregation co-exist with a relatively high rate of labour market participation. Nevertheless, those groups that are most strongly segregated in the United Kingdom -Pakistani and Bangladeshi -are also the ones that have the lowest labour market participation (Modood et al. 1997) . This suggest that the link between low labour market participation and segregation also exists in the United Kingdom, but that it occurs at a higher overall level of labour market participation due to the country's less generous welfare state.
Crime levels cross-nationally compared: immigrants' share of the prison population
If there is one aspect of integration that can be misused for mobilizing ethnic hatred, it is immigrants' real or alleged association with crime. There are several reasons why many immigrant groups across Europe display higher crime levels than the population average. Immigrants are disproportionately often unemployed and poor and they have a much younger population structure than the rest of the population. These are well-known risk factors for criminal behaviour. Part of the overrepresentation of immigrants among those convicted for crimes may in addition be due to discriminatory tendencies among the police or the judiciary.
The point that I want to make is therefore not that immigrants are more likely to be criminals than other citizens. What interests me here is to what extent there are cross-national differences in the rate of overrepresentation of immigrants among the prison population. Because the chances of getting involved in criminal behaviour are strongly linked to a person's socio-economic position, my hypothesis is:
(5) Countries with low labour market participation of immigrants will also be those where immigrants are more strongly overrepresented among the prison population. Table 6 shows the share of foreigners in the prison population relative to the share of foreign citizens in the whole population of a country. Unfortunately, no cross-national incarceration data are available on the basis of ethnicity or country of birth. However, Table 6 includes alternative statistical indicators for two countries, based on the foreign-born prison population in the Netherlands, and on racial minorities in the United Kingdom. Although these alternative measures strongly influence absolute incarceration rates (see the first column in the table), they do not strongly affect the measure that interests us here, namely the degree of overrepresentation of immigrants in the prison population (the third column).
The variation across the countries is stark. Overrepresentation of inmates from an immigrant background is by far strongest in the Netherlands, where their share in the prison population is, depending on the statistical basis chosen, six to eight times as high as in the general population. In the United Kingdom, by contrast, foreigners and racial minorities are only two to three times more likely to be in prison. The cross-country differences in Table 6 are very similar to those that we found for labour market participation. Next to the Netherlands, Sweden and Belgium also perform badly on both counts, whereas the overrepresentation of immigrants in German and Austrian, and to a lesser extent Swiss prisons is comparatively limited. 24 France is situated in the middle on both counts. One might alternatively argue that a strong overrepresentation of immigrants in prisons is not so much caused by variation in the levels of involvement of immigrants in crime as by differences in the general level of incarceration across countries. A similar level of immigrant incarceration might then lead to strong overrepresentation in countries with a generally low incarceration rate. Conversely, one can argue that tough crime policies characterized by high incarceration rates disproportionately affect immigrants, and that therefore immigrant overrepresentation in the prison population will be higher where general incarceration rates are high. As the final column of Table 6 shows, neither of these alternative explanations is valid as there is no correlation whatsoever between the general incarceration rate of the population and the degree to which immigrants are overrepresented in prisons.
24 The Swiss result should be interpreted with caution. Because the share of foreigners in the Swiss population is so much higher than in the other countries (see the second column of Table 6 ), the overrepresentation rate is affected by a ceiling effect.
Conclusions
The experiences of the Northwest European immigration countries that have been considered in this paper can be seen as a natural experiment on the integration of immigrant newcomers and the management of cultural diversity. All of these were relatively ethnically homogenous countries that turned into immigration countries roughly at the same time in the 1950s and 1960s. With the exception of Britain -where postcolonial immigrants from the Caribbean and South Asia predominated -all of them recruited a large part of their immigrant populations from Mediterranean countries, including the Muslim countries of the Maghreb and Turkey.
The policies that countries developed to incorporate these immigrants were in the initial guest-worker days quite similar, but started to diverge once it became clear that immigration had become a permanent phenomenon. Some countries with a more ethnic tradition of citizenship, such as Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, chose to retain high barriers for migrants to become full citizens and made residence rights dependent on performance on the labour market and absence of a criminal record. Moreover, these countries made few concessions to immigrants' cultural specificity. Other countries such as the Netherlands and Sweden chose the opposite direction and argued that integration could best be achieved by granting immigrants easy access to full citizenship rights, security of residence even in the case of welfare dependence or conviction for crimes, and state support and protection for their languages, cultures, and ethnic organizations and institutions. France followed a combination of individual equality and reluctance to recognize and promote cultural group differences. Now, some 25 years after these policies were put into place, we can see how these different treatments have affected the outcomes of integration in a variety of domains such as the labour market, segregation, and crime. The Netherlands play a crucial role in this natural experiment, because they implemented the prescripts of multiculturalism as a philosophy of integration (Favell 1998) to an extent that probably no other European country has. If we take the results of Dutch integration policies as a test case for whether state-sponsored multiculturalism is a successful recipe for the integration of immigrants, the conclusion is quite sobering. On the basis of the multicultural philosophy, the Netherlands should have been a country that has been comparatively successful in solving problems of integration and combating exclusion and segregation. But quite to the contrary, the Netherlands are faced with low labour market participation, strong segregation, and comparatively high levels of crime among immigrants. The Netherlands share these disappointing integration outcomes with two countries that have followed a similar integration philosophy, Sweden and (particularly the Flemish part of) Belgium. By contrast, those countries that according to the assumptions underlying the multicultural integration philosophy should have been faced with particularly acute integration problems -Austria, Germany, and Switzerland -actually perform better, whether we look at labour market participation, segregation levels, or incarceration rates.
Throughout this paper, I have emphasized that it is important to consider the interaction between multicultural integration policies and the welfare state. In countries with a limited welfare state such as the United Kingdom and the classical immigration countries, immigrants are by and large forced by the discipline of the market to make it on their own. Although a few may survive in ethnic niches, most immigrants will have to acquire the linguistic and cultural skills that are necessary to earn a living. However, in countries such as the Netherlands, Sweden, and Belgium, immigrants were able to survive on welfare supports without making such adjustments. The less tolerant reactions to immigrants in European welfare states must also be seen in this context. In the absence of a strong welfare state, immigration tends to be economically advantageous to most people, because it makes services and products available at a lower cost. Since then, home-grown terrorist cells that originated in such segregated communities have provided further fuel to these debates. Nonetheless, the United Kingdom can be seen as an example of a country that has implemented multicultural policies -albeit of a more limited nature than the Netherlands -without producing negative socio-economic integration outcomes, with the notable exception of residential segregation. The reason that I have advanced is that the United Kingdom has a less generous welfare state than Continental Northwest European countries, with more emphasis on self-reliance and more opportunities for low-wage employment. An additional explanation for the comparatively favourable British results may be that the British immigrant population is strongly dominated by postcolonial groups, which had pre-existing linguistic and cultural ties to the immigration country.
The German-speaking countries have achieved their comparatively good performance along a different path. Although these countries, or at least Germany and Austria, have relatively generous and encompassing welfare states, their restrictive aliens legislation has made naturalization and residence rights dependent on performance. Immigrants who become long-term dependent on social welfare risk expulsion, or it can be a barrier to a more secure residence status. In these countries an immigrant also risks his residence status or will fail to get a more secure one in the case of conviction for crimes, even relatively minor ones. In a way, these welfare states have replaced the discipline that the market exerts on immigrants in countries such as the United Kingdom or the United States with the discipline of the state. By contrast, the Dutch and Swedish approaches, which offered immigrants encompassing rights including unrestricted access to the full panoply of welfare state benefits without demanding much in return, may have been well-intended, but, instead of building on immigrants' ambitions and energy, have often turned them into passive welfare state clients.
To prevent such outcomes, European countries may choose to restrict the accessibility and benefit levels of welfare and social security, and to become thus more like the United Kingdom or the United States. A recent move in this direction in the Netherlands has been to abolish entitlements to social welfare for those under the age of 27. Another type of policy response that many European countries have adopted -not coincidentally first introduced in the Netherlandshas been an increased emphasis on linguistic and to some extent also cultural assimilation, in the form of obligatory integration courses for both newly arriving immigrants, and for those who are dependent on welfare. A final possible policy response would be to move in the direction of the German-speaking countries by making access to full citizenship rights dependent on performance.
I emphasize that the sobering conclusions that this paper draws about multiculturalism as an integration policy strategy only pertain to its effects on socio-economic participation and equality. It may well be the case that multicultural policies have been successful in other regards, for instance the political participation of immigrants (e.g., Fennema and Tillie 1999) . Moreover, legitimate normative reasons have been advanced (among many others, Kymlicka 1995; Carens 2000; Parekh 2002 ) why state support for, and recognition of cultural differences is valuable for its own sake. However, the analyses presented in this paper indicate that in considering such policies one should take into account that, at least in the context of developed welfare states, there are real tradeoffs with the goals of socio-economic participation and equality. Normative theories of multiculturalism have a tendency to be preoccupied almost exclusively with formal rights and recognition, but it is equally necessary and normatively important to look at the outcomes of integration policies in terms of participation, equality, and segregation. If there is one thing the European experience teaches us, it is that in dealing with the complex issues of difference and equality in immigration societies we cannot simply assume that what is normatively preferable from a rights-focused point of view of will also be practically efficient from an outcomes point of view.
